

Natural Law Tradition and Confucian Culture: Beyond East-West Divide

Guillermo Dionisio

Department of Philosophy, University of Asia and the Pacific

Abstract:¹

For a long time the dichotomy of concept of rights as emerging from Natural Law tradition and concept of duties as springing from Confucian culture gives a prominent face to the East-West divide. Often, the Western man is described thinking in terms of rights of the individual or personal liberties, whereas the East Asian man is portrayed thinking more in terms of duties or obligations, order and harmony. In other cases the West or the European American is said to be democratic, while the East or the Asian 'other' is simply not. But this usual distinctions between rights and duties, democracy and the lack of it as cultural fronts are overdrawn and missing many finer points. As this paper will show, there has been emphasis on duty and a sense of rights in both East and West largely obscured by a selective perception of Natural Law tradition and a mistaken interpretation of Confucianism. A closer look into Natural Law tradition and Confucian culture may show that they could only be as isolated from each other as two sides of the same coin.

Key words: East-West dialogue, natural law tradition, Confucianism, rights, freedom

¹This paper was presented at the Annual International Conference of the Asian Association of Christian Philosophers with the theme "The Rise of the Asian Century" held at Leong Hall, Ateneo de Manila University, 10-11 April 2013.

ISSN: 2362-7581

© 2014 Guillermo R. Dionisio

http://www.filocracia.org/issue1/Dionisio_Feb2014.pdf

A Mapping of East-West Divide

Over 2500 years ago, Sophocles introduced the woman named Antigone. She was seeking to give a proper burial to her brother, who was an enemy of the state. The king forbade her. But she argued that there is a law higher than the state's. She ought to follow it for no one *may* violate it, not even the king. The law primarily says: good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be shunned. What Antigone speaks of are principles that everyone knows by heart. She speaks of *Natural Law* that applies to all. This ancient universalization of a notion of law became a principal criterion for any serious formulation of moral and legal precepts. Eventually it shaped western civilization and all those that traversed the corridors of its influence. More notable of which is the Christian theology and philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and the theory of Natural Rights that developed between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.²

Over the Far East, more than 2500 years ago, following the *Spring and Autumn Period*, Kong Zi taught that subduing one's self and returning to propriety is perfect virtue: looking not at what is contrary to propriety; listening not to what is contrary to propriety; making no movement which is contrary to propriety. The prince is prince, and the minister minister, the father father, and the son son. These and more came down as the *Lun Yu* or the *Analects* and the *Meng Zi* that compile and elaborate some of Kong Zi's wise sayings collected by his disciples after his death. By the *Era of Warring States* that gave birth to the *Hundred Schools of Thought*, it was the ethics and harmony theory of Kong Zi that gave clear emphasis on the goodness of the human heart expressed in the discharge of duties. Centuries on, this sense of obligation imbues with life the cultural reach of the Middle Kingdom around it and beyond.

² Simon Hornblower, "Creation and Development of Democratic Institutions in Ancient Greece," *Democracy, the Unfinished Journey, 505 BC to AD 1993*, ed. by John Dunn (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1-16; as noted by Ying Shih Yu in "Democracy, Human Rights and Confucian Culture," *The Fifth Huang Hsing Foundation Hsueh Chun-tu Distinguished Lecture in Asian Studies* (Great Britain: Asian Studies Centre, St Anthony's College, University of Oxford, 2000), 1. Henceforth DHRCC.

This contrastive approach, espoused by some from either camp of East and West, insists on the essential difference underlying the correlation between cultural individualism and collectivism of the West and the East, respectively. Such approach is exemplified in the West with what Samuel Huntington of Harvard University claims:

Almost no scholarly disagreement exists on the proposition that traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or antidemocratic. The only moderating element was the classic Chinese polity (. . .) examination system [that] opened careers to the talented without regard to social background (. . .) [H]owever, a merit system of promotion does not make a democracy... Classic Chinese Confucianism and its derivatives in Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and, in diluted fashion, Japan emphasized the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights. Confucian societies lacked a tradition of rights against the state; to the extent that individual rights did exist, they were created by the state. Harmony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition. The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central values. The conflict of ideas, groups and parities was viewed as dangerous and illegitimate. Most important, Confucianism merged society and the state and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions to balance the state at the national level... In practice, Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy.³

Similarly, some from the East hold comparable views. Among them is Wu Te Yao, an authority of Singaporean Confucianism and a member of the committee that drafted the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He contends that:

[I]n the Five Classics and in the Four Books, and in the later writings of Confucians down to the nineteenth and

³ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Later Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 300-301; as noted in DHRCC, 5-6.

twentieth century, there is no mention whatsoever of rights, much less of human rights... It seems that a Chinese lives in a society of obligations, obligations to serve the ruler, obligations to work for the family, obligations to obey parents, obligations to help relatives, obligations to do well to glorify the name of the ancestors, obligations to defend the country in times of trouble, and obligations to oneself to cultivate one's own virtue. It would also seem that rights belong only to the individual—the Son of Heaven.⁴

But the emphasis on duties or obligations, order and harmony is not exclusive to Chinese culture or specific to Confucianism. A good amount of emphasis on duties is evident in many other cultures. There is the Banjul or the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Whereas the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights only mentions duties in a sentence in its penultimate article, the Banjul charter from its preamble to one entire chapter demands the fulfillment of duties.⁵ The same holds true among societies characteristically defined by their membership in a religion of the Book like Judaism and Islam. Such is also evident in Catholicism as concretely expressed in its 1983 *Codex Iuris Canonici* (cann. 208-231), which mentions the duties of the Catholic faithful before or over their rights.⁶ Even the West known for democracy and human rights may be said to have a similar story in its not so distant past.

Inversely, the giving of premium to subjective rights, personal liberty and democracy is not entirely a monopoly of the West. In 600 B.C. the first Indian democratic republic of the Licchavis appeared. Along with

⁴Wu Te Yao, "East Asian and Western Concepts of Rights: Their Origin and Development," *The Confucian Way* (Singapore: The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1987), 40-41, as noted by Heiner Roetz in his "Rights and Duties: East/West," *Human Rights and International Law: An Intercultural and Philosophical Perspective*, ed. by Walter Schweidler (Germany: International Summer Academy, Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, 2011), 127. Henceforth HRIL. Also cf. *Chinese Thought in a Global Context: Moral Bases of Contemporary Societies*, ed. by Karl-Heinz Pohl and Anselm W. Müller (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 301-317.

⁵HRIL, 128.

⁶*Codex Iuris Canonici*, prepared in English by Canon Law Society of America (Washington, D.C.: Canon Law Society of America, 1983).

it flourished at least ten more during the lifetime of the Buddha. They are, to name a few, the Sakyas of Kapilavatthu, bordering Nepal, the Bhaggas of Sumsumagiri, in the district of Mirzapur, and the Bullis of Allakappa, near the kingdom of Vethadipa, between modern Shahabad and Muzzafarpur.⁷ And while pre-modern Europe was being ruled by hereditary absolute monarchies, equality and freedom were being valued by a good many in the East. For example, ancient Burmese society enjoy freedom and equality and elect their king following old tribal requirements for the selection of chieftains.⁸ Likewise, in 1791 the British discovered a similar government set up in the island of Rotuma, which today forms part of Fiji. The Rotuma chief or *sou* was not a hereditary king but was elected from different districts every six months, extendible to twenty months.⁹

Over the West

Although the concept of rights continues to define a physiognomy for the West, it does not render a complete representation of it. What is often called Western issues of rights cannot be found in the pre-modern West. As Alasdair MacIntyre argues, the notion of rights is lacking means of expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin or Arabic, whether classical or medieval, before about 1400's, let alone in Old English.¹⁰ Furthermore, Isaiah Berlin claims that the notion of individual liberty that corresponds to rights has "no convincing evidence or any clear formulation (. . .) in the ancient [western] world."¹¹ Only around the fifteenth century was it articulated as a right of a subject or an individual person thanks to Jean Gerson (1363-1429), who was among the defenders of Joan of Arc.¹² From then on the use of the concept remained scarce from around the sixteenth to the seventeenth century. As Heiner Roetz points out, the elaboration of

⁷ Raul Manglapus, *Will of the People: Original Democracy in Non-Western Societies* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 27.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁰ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 69.

¹¹ Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1969), xi; as noted in HRIL, 130. Insertion in brackets mine.

¹² Theo Kobusch, *Die Entdeckung der Person: Metaphysik in Freiheit im modernen Menschenbild* (Freiburg: Herder, 1993), 34; as noted in HRIL, 130-1.

the concept of rights of the subject in connection to man's freewill comes about at a relatively late stage of European development with the articulation of the philosophies of Francisco Suarez (1548-1619), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677), and John Locke (1632-1704).

But one may ask: how about the tradition of Natural Law that emerged from the Hellenic culture and further developed in the Roman Empire? Is it not the source-spring if not the ancient name of subjective or individual rights?

Natural Law understood as *ius naturae* or *ius naturale*, rather than *lex naturae* or *lex naturalis*, refers to the Stoic concept of "to *physei dikaion*" or "what is right by nature."¹³ In the language of the Stoics, it means norm or prescription of concurrence with nature. Far from being directly a set of legitimate claims of individuals, Natural Law establishes first and foremost obligations or responsibilities for the sake of order and equity. As in the case of Antigone, "*humanitas*" demands that she perform the proper burial of her brother because it is good to be done and pursued.

The same kind of understanding of Natural Law is evident in the *Tractatus de Legibus* of Gratian's *Decretum*¹⁴ and in some ways in the later works of Thomas Aquinas, who is arguably the most influential medieval author on Natural Law. Aquinas treats of Natural Law as a certain rule and measure of acts, according to which someone is induced to do something, or is restrained from doing something.¹⁵ He reduces the concept of law to a concept of 'ordering of reason' (*ordinatio rationis*)¹⁶ about what is natural and equitable. Aquinas' concept of *ius* (or *lex* as he interchangeably uses them at times) is a lot different from the current English concept of "right." The notion of right in *ius naturale* expresses moral rectitude more than subjective or personal entitlements. "That an act is right does not imply

¹³ HRIL, 131.

¹⁴ Cf. Gratian, *The Treatise on Laws (Decretum DD. 1-20) with the Ordinary Gloss*, trans. by Augustine Thompson and James Gordley (Washington, D.C.: Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Canon Law 2, 1993).

¹⁵ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 90, a.1.

¹⁶ Martin Rhonheimer, *Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 62.

that anyone at all has a right to it.”¹⁷ Rather, it is the morally excellent thing to do. Josef Pieper argues that this gives more focus on the one who has the obligation, than the one who has the right. It is therefore not an exposition of human rights or to what one is entitled and can lay claim to, but an exposition and justification of the obligation to respect others’ dues or rights.¹⁸ In other words, *ius naturale* is more about responsibility or giving what is due to the other than pursuing what is due to oneself. Hence, the classical habit of *iustitia*.

Interestingly, Pieper thinks that this old or traditional Western commitment to justice, which is comparable to the Chinese approach particularly the Confucian culture, may lead to a deeper and far-reaching justification of human rights without being biased to or unduly focused on them.¹⁹

Over the East

It is widely accepted that democracy emerged from the Greeks of antiquity and that John Locke laid down the modern concept of sovereign rights as residing with the people who, consequently, may give to and withdraw from their leaders their mandate to govern. But this is not sufficient reason to overlook a kind of ancient history for such phenomenon elsewhere, like in the Confucian East. Contrary to popular anti-democratic image of Confucianism, Francis Fukuyama argues that “the obstacles posed by Confucian culture to [modern liberal democracy] do not seem greater than those of other cultures, and when compared to Hinduism or Islam, would appear to be much less significant.”²⁰ Confucians like Wang T’ao, who assisted James Legge in the English translation of Confucian classics, and K’ang Yu Wei even claim that the West’s democratic political system was first actualized in the Golden Age of China under the reign of the sage-

¹⁷ Jack Donnelly, “Natural Law and Rights in Aquinas’ Political Thought,” *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 (Dec. 1980), 530; as noted in HRIL, 132.

¹⁸ Josef Pieper, *Über die Gerechtigkeit*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Kösel, 1954), 88; as translated to English and noted by Heiner Roetz in HRIL, 132.

¹⁹ Loc. cit.

²⁰ Francis Fukuyama, “Modernization and the Future of Democracy in Asia,” *The Predicament of Democracy in Asia* (Taipei: National Culture Association, 1995), 20. Insertion in brackets mine.

emperors Yao and Shun.²¹ Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the founder of the Republic of China, in a certain manner substantiates this by affirming the Confucian origin of his “principle of democracy.”²² Similarly, the former Korean president Kim Dae-Jung avers that almost two millennia before Locke, Meng Zi has already been preaching about democratic ideals:

According to [Meng Zi’s] ‘Politics of Royal Ways,’ the king is the ‘Son of Heaven,’ and Heaven bestowed on its son a mandate to provide good government, that is, to provide good for the people. If he did not govern righteously, the people had the right to rise up and overthrow his government in the name of heaven. Meng Zi even justified regicide, saying that once a king loses the mandate of heaven he is no longer worthy of his subjects’ loyalty. The people came first, Meng Zi said, the country second, and the king third. The ancient Chinese philosophy of Minben Zhengzhi, or ‘people-based-politics’ teaches that ‘the will of the people is the will of heaven’ and that one should ‘respect the people as heaven’ itself (. . .) Clearly, Asia has democratic philosophies as profound as those of the West.²³

What is more, in China, there is recognition of the voting right of a very unusual class of electors. That is, the class of ancestors. In honoring ancestors, every decision is weighed and kept in accordance to what is in order for them. Thus, in China it may be said, that there reigns “the democracy of the dead.”²⁴

²¹ DHRCC, 4.

²² Sun Yat-Sen, *Sun Yat-Sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World*, ed. by Chu-yuan Cheng (London: Westview Press, 1989), 94.

²³ Kim Dae-Jung, “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,” *Foreign Affairs* (November-December 1994); as noted by Heiner Roetz in his “Mengzi’s Political Ethics and the Question of its Modern Relevance,” HRIL, 138. Also cf. *The Book of Mencius and its Reception in China and Beyond*, ed. by Chun-chieh Huang, Gregor Paul and Heiner Roetz (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008), 202-214.

²⁴ Marietta Stepanyants, “Could Asian Values Transfer into Global Values?,” Sonderbeitrag, Deutsche-China Gesellschaft, *Mitteilungsblatt, Bulletin of the German China Association* (2010), 86.

When it comes to rights, as defined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it may be helpful to keep in mind what Western history chronicles regarding theory of rights:

[T]he language of rights is difficult to use straightforwardly (. . .) to have a right is merely to be the beneficiary of someone else's duty, and that all propositions involving rights are straight-forwardly translatable into propositions solely involving duties. If this is true, then (. . .) to talk of "human rights" is simply to raise the question of what kinds of duty we are under to other human beings, rather than to provide us with any independent moral insights.²⁵

If rights may be expressed in terms of duties on other people or towards the possessors of rights, and such duties can be accounted for by a higher-order principle²⁶ then the non-mention of "human rights", just like the concept of democracy in the Confucian tradition, becomes understandable. Throughout Chinese history Confucians used the language of duties instead of rights.²⁷ Meng Zi in giving advice to King Hui of Liang describes the kinds of duties that a true king has to his people:

[W]hen determining what means of support the people should have, a clear-sighted ruler ensures that these are sufficient, on the one hand, for the care of the parents, and, on the other, for the support of the wife and children, so that people always have sufficient food in good years and escape starvation in bad; only then does he drive them towards goodness; in this way the people find it easy to follow him... If you wish to put this into practice, why not go back to fundamentals? If mulberry is planted in every homestead of five *mu* of land, then those who are fifty can wear silk; if chickens, pigs and dogs do not miss their breeding season, then those who are seventy can eat meat; if each lot of a hundred *mu* is not deprived of labour

²⁵ Richard Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories, Their Origin and Development* (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1; as noted in DHRCC, 13.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 6; as noted in DHRCC, 14.

²⁷ DHRCC, 14.

during the busy seasons, then families with several mouths to feed will not go hungry. Exercise due care over the education provided by village schools, and discipline the people by teaching them duties proper to sons and younger brothers, and those whose heads have turned grey will not be carrying loads on the road. When the aged wear silk and eat meat and the masses are neither cold nor hungry, it is impossible for their prince not to be a true King.²⁸

If these pieces of advice rendered in the language of duties were to be translated to the language of rights, they would be speaking about the right to use land, the right to work, the right to education, etc. Confucian texts are replete with discussions of duties expected of different types of individuals in the political and other social spheres. As rights and duties entail each other, many of the responsibilities elaborated on Confucian texts can be transposed and read as rights and not only as duties.

As regards the predication of human rights on the twin bill recognition of common humanity and human dignity, the *Lun Yu* or the *Analects*, the *Mencius* [Meng Zi], and other early Confucian texts have remarkable things to share.²⁹ Around the first century A.D. the Confucian notion of human dignity is already being mentioned as sufficient ground for an imperial decree prohibiting the sale or killing of slaves.³⁰ By 9 A.D. Hsin Dynasty Emperor Wang Mang condemns the previous Ch'in dynasty's custom of selling slaves in the market-place; the emperor says:

[The Ch'in state] also established market-places for male and female slaves, putting [human beings] in like enclosures with those for cattle and horses. In their rule over their common people and subjects, [the Ch'in rulers] made arbitrary decision about their lives. [As a result] villainous and oppressive persons took advantage of the

²⁸ *Mencius* [Meng Zi], I.A.7, trans. by D. C. Lau (New York: Penguin Books, 1970).

²⁹ Cf. Irene Bloom, "Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements: Mencian Confucianism and Human Rights," *Confucianism and Human Rights*, ed. by William Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 94-116; as noted in DHRCC, 15.

³⁰ DHRCC, 15.

opportunity to make profit, even kidnapping and selling other people's wives and children, going contrary to the will of Heaven and disordering human relationships. This is contradictory to the principle that "of all living things [i.e., animals and plants, produced by] Heaven and Earth, the human person is the noblest."³¹

A comparable incident occurred in 35 A.D. where the Emperor Kuang-wu of the Later Han promulgated an edict that says: "Of all living things produced by Heaven and Earth the human person is the noblest. [From now on] anyone who commits the crime of killing male or female slaves will not receive reduced punishment."³²

These two examples illustrate how the Confucian idea of human dignity translates to legal action in ancient China. Although, slavery was mentioned in both cases, it was not acceptable as a legitimate institution in Confucianism. This is unmistakable in a story told by Hu Shih about the famous poet T'ao Ch'ien who sent a young servant to his son. In a letter to his son the poet wrote: "Do treat this boy with kindness. For he is also the son of another father just like me."³³ This touching anecdote which Hu Shih got to read when he was still a teenager produced in him a lasting effect that shaped the way he related with whoever happened to work for him later in his life.³⁴

Neither East nor West

To consider whether human rights or democracy is an artifact of modern Western civilization or an implicit value among the peoples of the East or the Non-West is surely important. But what is more beneficial to do is to fully and fairly evaluate their merits more than their parentage and employ them for the sake of advancing the quality of human life. The so-called "Western ideals of freedom and liberty, rights and democracy" often construed as wholesale Western inheritance, are hardly exclusively Western in their provenance. A good amount of them have taken their full

³¹ Pan Ku, *The History of the Former Han Dynasty*, Vol. 3, trans. by Homer H. Dubbs (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1955), 285; as noted in DHRCC, 15-16.

³² DHRCC, 16.

³³ Translated to English and quoted by Ying Shih Yu in DHRCC, 16.

³⁴ Loc. cit.

form over ancient Western traditions as well as in parts of non-Western ancient traditions. In the words of Amartya Sen:

The main point to note is that both Western and non-Western traditions have much variety within themselves. Both in Asia and in the West, some have emphasized order and discipline, even as others have focused on freedom and tolerance. The idea of human rights as an entitlement of every human being, with an unqualified universal scope and highly articulated structure, is really a recent development. But there are limited and qualified defenses of freedom and tolerance, and general arguments against censorship, that can be found both in ancient traditions in the West and in cultures of non-Western societies.

The need to acknowledge diversity applies not only between nations and cultures, but also within each nation and culture. In the anxiety to take adequate note of international diversity and cultural divergences, and the so-called differences between “Western civilization,” “Asian values,” “African culture,” and so on, there is often a dramatic neglect of heterogeneity within each country and culture... Lines of division in commitments and skepticism do not run along national boundaries—they criss-cross at many different levels.³⁵

In this age of global exchange and dialogue, visions and imaginations continue to translate from one grammar to another that knows no strict national or cultural boundaries. In the final analysis, issues of justice, fairness and equality, duties and harmony only obtain greater value as a healthy mix of local grassroots and world-building missions. And as much as consciousness of the past and the traditional is important so too is the acceptance and celebration of dissent and questioning, differences and changes, as essentials in forming a solid will to move humanity forward. After all, traditions and cultures are only *means* rather than *ends*.

³⁵ Amartya Sen, “Human Rights and the Westernizing Illusion” (Commencement Address given at Bard College, 24 May 1997), *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 20, Issue 3 (Summer 1998).

What matters most is that each one is *more human* first and foremost before Western or Eastern.

References

- Aquinas, St. Thomas. *Summa Theologiae*. Trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947.
- Berlin, Isaiah. *Four Essays on Liberty*. Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Bloom, Irene. "Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements: Mencian Confucianism and Human Rights." In *Confucianism and Human Rights*. Edited by William Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.
- Donnelly, Jack. "Natural Law and Rights in Aquinas' Political Thought." In *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 (1980).
- Kim Dae-Jung. "Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values." In *Foreign Affairs* (November-December 1994).
- Kobusch, Theo. *Die Entdeckung der Person. Metaphysik in Freiheit im modernen Menschenbild*. Freiburg: Herder, 1993.
- Codex Iuris Canonici*. Prepared in English by Canon Law Society of America. Washington, D.C.: Canon Law Society of America, 1983.
- Fukuyama, Francis. "Modernization and the Future of Democracy in Asia." In *The Predicament of Democracy in Asia*. Taipei: National Culture Association, 1995.
- Gratian. *The Treatise on Laws (Decretum DD. 1-20) with the Ordinary Gloss*. Trans. by Augustine Thompson and James Gordley. Washington, D.C.: Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Canon Law, 1993.
- Hornblower, Simon. "Creation and Development of Democratic Institutions in Ancient Greece." In *Democracy, the Unfinished Journey, 505 BC to AD 1993*. Edited by John Dunn. Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Later Twentieth Century*. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

- MacIntyre, Alasdair. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd Edition. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.
- Manglapus, Raul. *Will of the People: Original Democracy in Non-Western Societies*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987.
- Meng Zi, et al. *Mencius [Meng Zi]*. Trans. by D. C. Lau. New York: Penguin Books, 1970.
- Pan Ku. *The History of the Former Han Dynasty*, Vol. 3. Trans. by Homer H. Dubbs. Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1995.
- Pohl, Karl-Heinz, et al (Eds.). *Chinese Thought in a Global Context: Moral Bases of Contemporary Societies*. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
- Pieper, Josef. *Über die Gerechtigkeit*, 2nd Ed. Munich: Kösel, 1954.
- Rhonheimer, Martin. *Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2000.
- Roetz, Heiner. "Mengzi's Political Ethics and the Question of its Modern Relevance." In *The Book of Mencius and its Reception in China and Beyond*. Edited by Chun-chieh Huang, Gregor Paul and Heiner Roetz. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008.
- . "Rights and Duties: East/West." In *Human Rights and International Law: An Intercultural and Philosophical Perspective*. Edited by Walter Schweidler. Germany: International Summer Academy, Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, 2011.
- Sen, Amartya. "Human Rights and the Westernizing Illusion." Commencement Address given at Bard College, 24 May 1997. In *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 20, Issue 3 (Summer 1998).
- Stepanyants, Marietta. "Could Asian Values Transfer into Global Values?" In *Mitteilungsblatt, Bulletin of the German China Association* (2010).
- Sun Yat-Sen. *Sun Yat-Sen's Doctrine in the Modern World*. Edited by Chu-yuan Cheng. London: Westview Press, 1989.
- Tuck, Richard. *Natural Rights Theories, Their Origin and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Wu Te Yao. "East Asian and Western Concepts of Rights: Their Origin and Development." In *The Confucian Way*. Singapore: The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1987.

Ying Shih Yü. "Democracy, Human Rights and Confucian Culture", *The Fifth Huang Hsing Foundation Hsueh Chun-tu Distinguished Lecture in Asian Studies*. Oxford: Asian Studies Centre, St Anthony's College, University of Oxford, 2000.